Fin Cascade

Prices as of 8 Oct 2026 close · Not investment advice

IIFL Finance Limited

NSE: IIFLNon Banking Financial Company (NBFC)

Share price

₹579.15

-1.60% close of 8 Oct 2026

Market cap ₹24,614 CrP/E 11.7

Price-based ratios (P/B, dividend yield, EV/EBITDA) are as of 5 Oct 2026, the close above is 8 Oct 2026.

Business score

How strong the business is, in one number. The parts behind it are in Pro.

62

out of 100 · worked out 8 Oct 2026

Your ratios

The numbers you want to see first. Tap Edit to change them.

Market cap

₹24,614 Cr

P/E ratio

11.7

P/B ratio

1.8

ROCE

10.9%

ROE

12.6%

Dividend yield

0.7%

Price & valuation chart

How the share price and its valuation have moved. Hover over the chart to see any day. Prices as of the last close.

Prices as of 8 Oct 2026 close52-week high ₹696.4052-week low ₹419.35

Answers

Simple answers to the questions investors ask most, from the company's own numbers.

How fast it has been growing

Sales grew 36.1% over the past year, and 18.2% a year over its longer record. Meanwhile what it keeps on lending slipped from 22.8% to 22% over the last two years.

Whether it grew faster than its sector

It grew 18.2% a year against a sector median of 16.0% — 2.2 percentage points faster.

Room to re-rate, or risk of de-rating

At 11.7× earnings against a market that pays 23.9× across 2199 companies we can price. Its own industry sits at 22.8×, across 5 companies. It is against its own five-year median of 13.4×, the 18th percentile of its own range.

Whether growth justifies the valuation

Priced at 3.9 times its growth rate, on earnings growth of 3%.

Profit growthPrice per ₹1 profitPer 1% growth
IIFL Finance Limited — this one3%/yr11.7×₹3.9
Bajaj Finance19%/yr29.0×₹1.5
Shriram Finance Limited19%/yr19.1×₹1.0
Tata Capital Limited17%/yr24.4×₹1.4
Cholamandalam Investment & Finance25%/yr22.8×₹0.91
Muthoot Finance43%/yr9.0×₹0.21

Compared with companies filed under the same label. That grouping comes from the exchange's filing category, so some of them may not be real rivals.

How it compares with its peers

Against companies the exchange files under the same label (Non Banking Financial Company (NBFC)), it ranks 19 of 73 on returns, 38 of 68 on growth. That grouping comes from the exchange's filing category, so some of them may not be real rivals.

What makes it hard to beat — and is that still true?

A narrow advantage: it earns 12.6% on capital, ahead of 74% of companies filed under the same label. That grouping comes from the exchange's filing category, so some of them may not be real rivals.

Whether its growth pays for itself

This question does not fit a lender: the money it lends out is its day-to-day outflow and the deposits or premiums it takes are the inflow, so a cash bridge cannot say whether its growth pays for itself. Look at the return on owners' money instead.

Profit reality check

Is the profit real cash? Simple checks on the accounts. Facts only, not advice.

Not enough filed accounts to run these checks yet.

Latest result · Q1 FY27

What the last results showed. Whether management kept its word is in Pro.

Profit rose 160% from last year to Rs 713.13 crore.

Announced 22 Jul 2026 · Consolidated · Unaudited

Revenue

₹3,919 Cr

Revenue vs last year

+32.7%

Revenue vs last quarter

+6.1%

Net profit

₹713 Cr

Profit vs last year

+160.3%

Profit vs last quarter

+14.5%

Net margin

18.2%

EPS

₹15.87

Earnings call transcript · 22 Jul 2026

Checklist before you investPRO

Points for and against, in one list.

Key numbers & peers

The main numbers grouped by topic, and how the company compares with similar ones.

Price

Market cap
₹24,614 Cr
Prev close
₹579.15
52w High
₹705
52w Low
₹409
Enterprise value
—
Beta
1.4
Price CAGR 1y
28.0%
Price CAGR 3y
-2.0%
Price CAGR 5y
15.0%
Price CAGR 10y
17.0%

Ratios

Return on assets
2.0%
PEG ratio
3.9
P/E ratio
11.7
P/B ratio
1.8
EV / EBITDA
—
Industry P/E
16.8
ROCE
10.9%
ROCE 5y average
—
ROE
12.6%
Debt / Equity
5.0
Interest coverage
—
Dividend yield
0.7%
ROE 3y average
12.0%
ROE last year
13.0%

Annual P&L

Annual revenue
₹13,366 Cr
Annual profit
₹1,817 Cr
Operating margin
20.0%
Net profit margin
13.6%
EBITDA margin
19.5%
Sales growth 3y
16.5%
Sales growth 5y
17.5%
Profit growth 3y
3.0%
Profit growth 5y
17.0%
EPS
₹39.1
Sales growth TTM
36.0%
Profit growth TTM
169.0%
Dividend payout
10.0%

Quarter P&L

Sales latest quarter
₹3,919 Cr
Profit latest quarter
₹713 Cr
YoY quarterly sales growth
32.7%
YoY quarterly profit growth
160.2%
OPM latest quarter
25.0%

Balance Sheet

Book Value
₹328
Face Value
₹2.0
Total debt
₹69,176 Cr
Total cash
₹6,374 Cr
Borrowings
₹69,176 Cr
Reserves / Equity
162.8

Cash Flow

Operating cash flow
-₹13,976 Cr
Free cash flow
-₹14,056 Cr
FCF yield
—
Net cash flow
₹1,262 Cr

Shareholding

Promoter holding
24.8%
FII holding
23.9%
DII holding
7.5%
Public holding
43.8%

Peer comparison

CompanyPrice ₹P/EMkt cap ₹ CrDiv yield %Profit qtr ₹ CrProfit var %Sales qtr ₹ CrSales var %ROCE %
Bajaj Finance948.3028.85,90,4070.576,080.627.423,165.518.610.9
Shriram Finance945.0019.62,22,3631.143,452.859.913,400.416.211.5
Tata Capital319.3024.91,35,5390.181,628.256.38,821.915.18.6
Cholaman.Inv.&Fn1,580.0023.51,34,9900.131,656.245.68,856.321.99.7
Muthoot Finance2,697.109.51,08,2801.112,824.838.88,671.634.415.8
L&T Finance Ltd264.3520.766,2551.04916.028.75,212.922.48.4
SBI Cards563.2023.653,5970.44664.419.55,040.63.410.1
IIFL Finance583.8011.824,9170.69713.1189.33,919.232.710.9
Median134.8019.64680.0011.138.349.128.39.5

Competes with: Bajaj Finance, Cholamandalam Investment & Finance, HDB Financial Services Limited, L&T Finance Limited, Muthoot Finance, SBI Cards & Payment Services, Shriram Finance Limited, Tata Capital Limited

Quarterly results

Sales and profit for each of the last 13 quarters. Newest on the right. ₹ crore.

Consolidated · to 30 Jun 2026
Line itemJun 2023Sep 2023Dec 2023Mar 2024Jun 2024Sep 2024Dec 2024Mar 2025Jun 2025Sep 2025Dec 2025Mar 2026Jun 2026
Revenue2,3012,4782,6492,8542,6212,5562,4432,5912,9533,3053,4273,6933,919
Expenses8228779481,2551,1091,1051,3071,0651,2671,3231,2801,1941,211
Financing Profit591670715536470488140357397600710889989
Financing Margin %2627271918196141318212425
Other Income6957466812-5826364573
Interest8889329851,0631,0429639961,1691,2891,3821,4371,6101,719
Depreciation42434550464646514747536463
Profit before tax618684716554436-140101309356557663833929
Tax %2423242222-3319192325242523
Net Profit473526545431338-9382251274418501623713
EPS in Rs1011128.816.79-3.720.964.895.498.86111416
Gross NPA %1.841.841.712.322.252.352.422.232.342.141.601.461.55
Net NPA %1.061.020.871.201.111.061.011.051.131.020.750.730.82

Profit & loss

Yearly sales, costs and profit for 12 years, plus the last 12 months (TTM). ₹ crore.

Consolidated · to 31 Mar 2026
Line itemMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026TTM
Revenue3,5513,9523,1636,4054,9784,8475,9686,9918,44410,47210,23313,36614,344
Expenses1,3191,3626892,2211,4351,6822,2392,3552,9363,8424,5595,0185,008
Financing Profit7879006891,4549507521,0901,6252,2632,7341,4782,6123,188
Financing Margin %22232223191618232726142022
Other Income-4837561212792032218-583719
Interest1,4451,6901,7862,7302,5932,4132,6383,0113,2453,8964,1965,7176,148
Depreciation5966166732106106122153181189211226
Profit before tax7248431,0481,4481,1307251,0051,5362,1132,5727072,4092,981
Tax %343422303031242324231825
Net Profit4765558221,0217965037611,1881,6081,9745781,8172,256
EPS in Rs131519222212182835428.923949
Dividend Payout %2126212020171511109010

Compounded growth

Average yearly growth over different spans, as stored. A span can cross a demerger or an acquisition.

Compounded sales growth

10 years
13%
5 years
17%
3 years
17%
TTM
36%

Compounded profit growth

10 years
12%
5 years
17%
3 years
3%
TTM
169%

Stock price CAGR

10 years
17%
5 years
15%
3 years
-2%
1 year
28%

Return on equity

10 years
14%
5 years
14%
3 years
12%
Last year
13%

Balance sheet

What the company owns and what it owes, at the end of each year. ₹ crore.

Consolidated
Line itemMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026
Equity Capital626364646476767676768585
Reserves2,4963,2894,3184,6794,2904,6845,3126,3888,91610,56112,32713,835
Borrowing14,63915,94824,33034,32626,51727,99632,58336,08640,01747,13651,06869,176
Other Liabilities2,2213,5665,0495,4262,3681,6172,6963,3603,9934,6304,1645,891
Total Liabilities19,41822,86633,76144,49533,23934,37340,66745,91053,00262,40367,64488,987
Fixed Assets5005336568713696076757758629051,4871,514
CWIP1067111072762852236
Investments1,2831,8674,1532,150212770321,1923,5114,0594,4386,092
Other Assets17,62420,46128,88141,36532,65132,99439,95443,93748,60257,38761,69681,375
Total Assets19,41822,86633,76144,49533,23934,37340,66745,91053,00262,40367,64489,059

Cash flows

Real money coming in and going out each year — from the business, from investments and from loans. ₹ crore.

Consolidated
Line itemMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026
Cash from Operating Activity-2,126-54-4,329-10,4834221,101-3,5871,784-5,225-8,716-4,781-13,976
Cash from Investing Activity-361-671-2,602-374562-919236-996-2,716468-1,149-2,606
Cash from Financing Activity2,9045259,0948,468201094,4282,7815,3617,0885,52617,843
Net Cash Flow417-2002,162-2,3891,0042901,0773,569-2,580-1,160-4031,262
Free Cash Flow-2,211-131-4,343-10,6543551,052-3,6211,684-5,484-8,804-4,839-14,056

Ratios

How fast customers pay, how long stock sits, and how well capital earns — year by year.

Consolidated
Line itemMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026
ROE %19171817161115201918513

Shareholding pattern

Who owns the company — founders (promoters), foreign funds, Indian funds and the public. In %.

Consolidated · to 30 Jun 2026
Line itemSep 2023Dec 2023Mar 2024Jun 2024Sep 2024Dec 2024Mar 2025Jun 2025Sep 2025Dec 2025Mar 2026Jun 2026
Promoters252525252525252525252525
FIIs283129303028282727282824
DIIs7.308.278.597.436.254.505.548.099.139.167.097.50
Public403637373943424039384044
No. of Shareholders67,66083,6761,49,3091,45,0731,58,1331,73,5301,69,3741,49,2471,42,8081,34,2741,24,5431,27,688

Price trend

The price as a Renko brick chart: small moves drop out so the bigger path stands out.

Change over 1 year +17.0% (₹495.15 → ₹579.15)Brick size ₹22.01 (fixed)Bricks 35
₹500₹700₹579Nov '25Jan '26Mar '26May '26Jul '26Sep '26
Price moved up one brickPrice moved down one brickLast close ₹579.15 on 8 Oct 2026

Every brick is the same size, about one typical day's move. A new brick needs a full brick's move; turning the other way needs two. Bricks show where the price went, not where it will go.

Open interestPRO

Where option traders are positioned on this stock.

Industry numbers

The numbers that matter most in this industry, from the company's own filings.

1 when an audit qualification is filed as repetitive

0.00flag

2026-03-31

AUM / loan book

1,15,523inr_cr

2026-06-30

capital adequacy (CRAR) %

24.30pct

2026-06-30

cost-to-income %

46.40

the company's own unlisted debt securities in default at period end

0.00cr

2026-06-30

gross NPA %

1.60pct

2026-06-30

the company's own loans / revolving facilities in default at period end (standalone filing)

0.00cr

2026-06-30

net NPA %

0.80pct

2026-06-30

guarantees / comfort given for promoter, promoter group, directors and KMP

163cr

2026-03-31

loans outstanding to promoter, promoter group, directors and KMP (governance filing)

0.00cr

2026-03-31

security given for the borrowing of promoter, promoter group, directors and KMP

0.00cr

2026-03-31

provision coverage %

94.00pct

2026-06-30

FY revenue / permanent employees + workers, same basis (calc)

45,57,824inr

2026-03-31

return on assets %

3.10pct

2026-06-30

News

News and filings about IIFL Finance Limited. Open one to see why it matters.

Supply chain

Who it buys from, sells to and competes with — as recorded in our map of company links.

About

What the company is, from our own records: where it sits, where it makes things, and what it is made of.

Sector
Financial Services
Industry
Non Banking Financial Company (NBFC)
Classification
Financial Services › Non Banking Financial Company (NBFC)
ISIN
INE530B01024

News impact

Big market events that reach IIFL Finance Limited, and how the effect spreads.

Who it hits first

  • Bajaj Finance, India's large consumer lender, approved raising Rs 11,700 crore by selling new shares to big investors (a QIP) plus Rs 5,800 crore of warrants (rights to buy shares later) to its parent Bajaj Finserv, totalling Rs 17,500 crore.
  • Existing Bajaj Finance shareholders face dilution (their slice shrinks) because new shares are created, which helps explain the 10% slide in the past month.
  • Bajaj Finserv, the parent holding company, will pay up to Rs 5,800 crore to take the warrants, lifting its stake if it converts them, pending regulatory approvals.

Who may gain

  • Bajaj Finance long-term: a stronger capital base to grow loans once the Rs 17,500 crore lands
  • New QIP buyers: typically get large blocks at a small discount to the market price
  • Bajaj Finserv long-term: a bigger ownership stake in a better-capitalised lender

Along the supply chain

Downstream

No downstream product change — borrowers and partners see no change in loans or terms from the QIP itself; any benefit comes later if the new capital funds faster lending.

Upstream

No direct supply-chain link — a share sale does not change what Bajaj Finance buys from vendors such as Quess (staffing services) or Xtranet; purely a capital-flow event.

Where demand moves

Business

No change in borrower demand for loans — people do not borrow more or less because a lender sells shares; this is a balance-sheet event, not a loan-demand event.

Capital

Fresh equity supply of Rs 17,500 crore: Rs 11,700 crore of new Bajaj Finance shares to institutions via QIP, and Rs 5,800 crore of warrants to Bajaj Finserv, bringing cash in but diluting existing holders until the money is deployed into loan growth.

How it spreads across sectors

Financial Services

Company-specific dilution with no sector readthrough — rival lenders face no change in loan demand; at most a mild watch on a better-capitalised Bajaj Finance competing harder over time.

When it plays out

Immediate

QIP pricing and discount news drives near-term price pressure on Bajaj Finance as the market reprices dilution; Bajaj Finserv trades with the funding overhang.

Medium term

Market judges whether the Rs 17,500 crore turns into faster loan growth and stable asset quality (defaults), which decides if dilution pays off.

Short term

Regulatory approvals and QIP allotment confirm dilution and cash received; volatility fades once placement size and price are known.

Who it hits first

  • India's competition watchdog (CCI) cleared Fairfax India to buy a bigger stake in IIFL Capital Services, a stockbroker that earns fees from trading and investing services.
  • The deal brings fresh money through new shares plus an open offer where small shareholders can sell their shares at a set price.
  • IIFL Finance, a separate lender sharing the IIFL brand, may get a small image boost but receives no direct money.

Who may gain

  • IIFL Capital Services shareholders, who get an open-offer exit and a stronger backer
  • IIFL Capital Services itself, which gains fresh funds and market trust for growth

Along the supply chain

Downstream

No direct customer chain shift — traders and investors face the same fees today; any benefit comes later if the new funds improve service.

Upstream

No direct supply-chain link — purely capital-flow event; the broker's tech and data vendors see no immediate order change.

Where demand moves

Business

No new customer orders yet — brokers gain only if Fairfax's money funds better apps and wider reach that later pulls in more traders.

Capital

Fresh equity flows into IIFL Capital Services via the new share issue, and the open offer puts cash in the hands of small shareholders who tender.

How it spreads across sectors

Financial Services

Mild positive mood for brokers as a big investor backs one of them, but no fee or volume lift for rivals like Groww, Angel One or Motilal Oswal.

When it plays out

Immediate

1–7 days: IIFL Capital Services shares react to the clearance and open-offer terms while rival brokers drift on mood.

Medium term

1–6 months: Fairfax funds support hiring and tech; any market-share gains for IIFL Capital show up in volumes.

Short term

1–4 weeks: open-offer timetable and price set the floor; focus shifts to dilution from the new share issue.

9 Aug, 04:35 IST · Market event · high impact

Gold posts its best week in eight months, up about 7-8% to $4,384.60/oz, as falling oil and weak US jobs data push out Fed rate-hike bets - and Titan's June-quarter profit jumps 63% on jewellery demand at those prices

Gold had its biggest weekly jump in eight months because cheaper oil and weak American job numbers made a US rate rise look less likely, which helps jewellers and gold-loan lenders since every gram they sell or lend against is now worth more.

Consumer DurablesFinancial Services

Who it hits first

  • Gold jewellery makers and retailers - Sky Gold, Senco, Radhika Jeweltech, Titan, Kalyan Jewellers - sell by weight, so a higher gold price raises the rupee value of every sale and revalues the stock they already hold
  • Gold-loan lenders Muthoot Finance, Manappuram and IIFL Finance can lend more against the same jewellery and have a bigger safety cushion if a borrower defaults
  • Jewellery buyers pay more per gram, which usually shifts demand toward lighter pieces rather than stopping it - Titan's 43% jewellery growth is the evidence

Who may gain

  • Senco Gold and Radhika Jeweltech, the cheapest names in the group relative to their industry
  • Muthoot Finance, whose loan book and collateral cover both expand directly with the gold price
  • Sky Gold, whose contract-manufacturing order values are struck per gram

Along the supply chain

Downstream

Retail buyers face a higher price per gram, so they typically shift to lighter-weight or lower-carat pieces and lean more on exchange of old jewellery rather than cancelling purchases. Gold-loan borrowers get more credit against the same pledged jewellery, which puts more money into small-business and rural hands and feeds through to consumption.

Upstream

India imports almost all its gold, so a higher dollar price raises the landed cost for every jeweller and refiner. Bullion dealers and importers finance that inventory, so their working-capital needs rise with the price. Recycled or exchanged old gold becomes a more attractive supply source for retailers when fresh imports get expensive.

Where demand moves

Business

A higher gold price does not destroy jewellery demand in India - it re-prices it. The same gram sold now generates more revenue, and existing inventory is revalued upward, so revenue and reported margin both rise for jewellers before any volume change. Gold-loan lenders get a parallel effect: each gram pledged now supports a larger loan, so the loan book grows without new customers. The offset is that buyers trade down to lighter pieces, which caps volume growth over time.

Capital

Money rotates into gold-linked equities as the metal breaks out, and specifically toward the cheaper mid-cap jewellers and gold financiers rather than the expensive large-cap. It also rotates out of rate-sensitive sectors indirectly, because the same weak US jobs data that lifted gold also pushed out Federal Reserve rate-hike expectations, weakening the dollar and supporting emerging-market flows.

How it spreads across sectors

Consumer Durables

Jewellery retailers and manufacturers see revenue per gram and inventory value rise together, though buyers trade down in weight

Financial Services

Gold-loan lenders can advance more per gram, expanding loan books and reducing loss-given-default

Commodity angle

Commodity

Gold

Note

Cost weights exist only for the three ranker-selected jewellers; margin_impact_bps is computed as change_1m_pct x cost_weight_pct. For Sky Gold, Senco, Titan and Kalyan Jewellers the sign reflects gold as an input cost, but note that revenue is also struck per gram, so the realised effect on profit has historically been positive - see historical_pattern.

Shock type

price

When it plays out

Immediate

Gold-linked equities should open firm. Expect the cheapest names relative to their industry - Senco at PE 11.21 and Radhika Jeweltech at PE 10.96 against a Consumer Durables sector PE median of 38.08 - to move most, with Titan lagging on valuation.

Medium term

Over one to six months the key question is whether the Federal Reserve actually stops hiking. If it does, gold's rally extends and jewellers keep re-rating. If US data turns hot again, the rate-hike bet returns, the dollar strengthens and this reverses - the January 2026 rally, which faded badly, is the warning case.

Short term

Over one to four weeks, watch whether the metal holds above $4,300. The historical pattern shows most of the jeweller gain arrives in week one, then fades unless gold keeps rising. Also watch whether Muthoot's margin problem resurfaces at its next update.

Other sectors it reaches

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Who it hits first

  • Muthoot Finance shares fell 7.33% to Rs 2,890.9 on 3 August after dropping as much as 11% during the day, even though the company grew its gold-loan book about 43% and grew profit sharply. The market punished the shrinking profit margin on each loan, not the growth.

Who may gain

  • Broad-based banks with only a small gold-loan book are the quiet winners: they are undercutting the specialists on rate and taking share, which is precisely the competition Muthoot blamed. The gain is spread so thinly across large banks that it is immaterial to any single one, so none receives a signal.

Along the supply chain

Downstream

The customer is the small trader, farmer or household pledging jewellery for short-term cash. They are the winners: more competition means they borrow more cheaply. There is no downstream company that suffers a shortage, because the product being supplied — credit — is becoming more plentiful, not scarcer.

Upstream

There is no physical supply chain here. The nearest equivalent is the funding side: these lenders borrow from banks and the bond market and lend on at a spread. A thinner spread means each rupee they raise earns less, so their appetite to borrow and grow slows, which marginally reduces demand for wholesale funding from banks and debt mutual funds.

Where demand moves

Business

Borrowers who pledge gold are being courted by more lenders at once, so they get cheaper loans and the lenders keep a smaller spread. Demand for gold loans itself is not falling — Muthoot grew its book 43% — it is the price of that lending that is dropping. With gold down 10.07% over three months, each piece of jewellery also supports a smaller loan, so lenders must find more customers just to stand still.

Capital

Money is leaving the specialist gold-lending names as brokers cut price targets. Because Muthoot is the sector bellwether, the selling spreads to Manappuram, IIFL, CSB Bank and Fedbank Financial rather than rotating within the group. Past episodes show it does not rotate into a safe corner of the gold-loan complex — in the month after the 30 January 2026 fall every peer we track was lower.

How it spreads across sectors

Financial Services

Specialist gold-loan lenders de-rate together while banks quietly take share; no impact on insurance, broking or payments despite those sitting in the same sector label

Commodity angle

Commodity

Gold

Note

Every gold-loan lender below carries a DEPENDS_ON_COMMODITY edge to Gold with direction 'positive', meaning they benefit when gold rises. Gold has fallen 10.07% over three months, so the edge resolves negative for all of them. The graph stores no cost_weight_pct on these edges, so a margin impact in basis points cannot be computed without fabricating the weight; margin_impact_bps is therefore left null rather than guessed.

Price updated at

2026-08-03

Shock type

collateral_value

Unit

USD/oz

When it plays out

Immediate

Expect continued weakness across the gold-loan lenders for a few sessions as brokers publish their reduced price targets and index funds adjust. Watch whether Muthoot holds the Rs 2,890 level it closed at.

Medium term

Either competition eases and margins stabilise — in which case a price-to-earnings ratio of 11 against a sector PE median of 20.6 makes Muthoot cheap — or banks keep undercutting and the whole specialist gold-lending model re-rates permanently lower. Falling gold prices make the second outcome more likely.

Short term

The number that matters is the lending margin in the Q2 FY27 result, due around late October, because Muthoot has said it will only revise its roughly 15% growth guidance after that. If gold keeps falling, expect loan growth guidance to be cut alongside the margin.

Other sectors it reaches

  • {"reason":"Layer 5.5 numeric gate not met: len(sectors) = 1, which is below the threshold of 3","status":"skipped"}

2 Aug, 04:33 IST · Market event · high impact

Muthoot Finance Q1 profit rises 25% to Rs 2,550 crore as gold-loan assets jump 44%, and it names Alexander George as Managing Director from 1 October

India's biggest gold-loan lender earned a quarter more profit as people borrowed far more against their jewellery, which is good for rival gold lenders too — but the shares have fallen hard on its last two results days, so the market may already expect this.

Financial ServicesInsurance & NBFC

Who it hits first

  • Muthoot Finance's Q1 net profit rose 25% to about Rs 2,550 crore and its gold-loan assets grew 44% year-on-year — an exceptional pace for a secured book, driven by high gold prices letting each gram of pledged jewellery support a bigger loan.
  • The company named Alexander George as Managing Director from 1 October, a planned succession that introduces execution and transition risk at the top of a founder-family business.
  • Every other gold-backed lender is seeing the same demand, because the driver is the gold price and household cash need, not anything Muthoot did uniquely.

Who may gain

  • CSB Bank, which has the highest gold-loan concentration of any listed Indian bank and funds it with cheap deposits.
  • IIFL Finance, whose large gold-loan book reads across directly at a much cheaper valuation than Muthoot.
  • Manappuram Finance and Fedbank Financial Services, which serve the same borrowers, though both carry offsetting weaknesses.
  • Jewellers indirectly, because a liquid gold-loan market makes households more willing to buy jewellery knowing they can borrow against it.

Along the supply chain

Downstream

The borrowers are households and small businesses using jewellery to raise short-term cash for working capital, medical costs, education fees and farm inputs. Money released this way flows into local consumption and small-business activity, which is a mild positive for rural-facing consumer goods and two-wheeler demand. Auction of unredeemed gold, when it happens, puts a small amount of scrap gold back into the jewellery trade.

Upstream

Gold-loan companies fund themselves by borrowing from banks and issuing bonds and non-convertible debentures, so 44% book growth means materially higher funding needs — good business for the banks and debt investors lending to them, but it also means these companies are exposed to any rise in funding costs. Their other input is the gold price itself: at USD 4,115.10/oz gold is up 1.89% over a month but down 10.28% over three months, so a further fall would reduce how much can be lent per gram and could trigger margin calls on existing loans.

Where demand moves

Business

High gold prices raise the loan a household can raise against the same jewellery, so demand for gold-backed credit expands without any new customers being acquired. That demand is spread across Muthoot, Manappuram, IIFL, CSB Bank and Fedbank rather than captured by one lender. It is also demand taken from somewhere else: households borrowing against gold are choosing that over unsecured personal loans and microfinance, so the credit-card and personal-loan lenders lose marginal borrowers to a cheaper secured product. Upstream, these lenders need more funding, so they borrow more from banks and the debt market, which is a source of business for wholesale lenders.

Capital

Money rotates within the gold-lending group towards the cheaper names — IIFL at a PE of 12.1 and CSB Bank at 8.77 against the Financial Services sector PE median of 20.6 — rather than into Muthoot itself, which has fallen on each of its last two results days despite similar numbers. That is a classic buy-the-read-across, sell-the-news pattern. A wider flow moves out of unsecured consumer lenders towards secured gold lenders, because investors prefer collateralised books when they are worried about household credit quality.

How it spreads across sectors

Financial Services

Gold-backed lending is growing far faster than the overall credit market, pulling capital and investor attention towards secured consumer lenders and away from unsecured ones.

Insurance & NBFC

Strong gold-loan economics — Muthoot's net interest margin of 12.75% versus the 3% strong threshold — reset what investors expect from specialist non-bank lenders.

Commodity angle

Commodity

Gold

Note

Fired on the L6.2 demand-shock rule: a 44% jump in gold-loan assets is a gold-collateral credit demand shock and all five signal tickers carry a DEPENDS_ON_COMMODITY edge to Gold with direction 'positive' (they benefit when gold rises). No cost_weight_pct is recorded on any of these edges, so no margin_impact_bps can be computed — these are collateral-value relationships, not input-cost relationships. Gold's three-month fall of 10.28% is the main risk to the loan-per-gram economics.

Price updated at

2026-07-31

Shock type

demand

Unit

USD/oz

When it plays out

Immediate

Muthoot itself has fallen on its last two results days (-6.22% and -11.82%) despite good numbers, so the immediate risk is a sell-the-news reaction; the read-across names have tended to move less sharply.

Medium term

Two things decide whether this holds. First, the gold price — it is down 10.28% over three months, and a sustained fall reduces loan-per-gram and can trigger margin calls on existing loans. Second, the 1 October Managing Director transition at Muthoot, which will be judged on whether growth and credit discipline continue under new leadership.

Short term

Over the following weeks watch whether the peer group re-rates on the read-across: IIFL was up 14.87% a month after Muthoot's Q4 print while Muthoot itself was down 10.31%, which is exactly the rotation this analysis expects.

Dividends, splits & big trades

Money paid out, share splits and buybacks, and big buys or sells by funds and insiders.

Dividends

29 Jan 2026interim₹4
25 Jan 2024interim₹4
7 Feb 2023interim₹4
3 Feb 2022interim₹3.5
4 Feb 2021interim₹3
19 Mar 2020interim₹2.25
6 Feb 2019interim₹5
7 Feb 2018interim₹5

Splits, bonuses & buybacks

  • daily-prices repair: 9 rows from NSE's archive (replace 1, delete 1, insert 7), 2016-10-30..2026-02-01 (docs/flat_day_repair.md)1× · 30 Oct 2016

Bulk & block deals

DateWhoBought / soldSharesPrice
30 Jul 2026FIH MAURITIUS INVESTMENTS LTDSELL63,39,355₹590.00
30 Jul 2026SMALLCAP WORLD FUND INCBUY61,73,152₹590.00

Documents

Annual reports, results presentations and earnings calls, straight from the source.

Facts from company filings and exchange data. Not investment advice: nothing here tells you to buy or sell.